There have been recent suggestions that the amygdala passing 16 tests assessing his ability to inhibit dominant responses, create and maintain goal-related behaviours, may be involved in the development or mediation of 'theory of mind'. We report a patient, B.M., with early and temporally sequence behaviour. The findings are discussed with reference to models regarding the role of or congenital left amygdala damage who, by adulthood, had received the psychiatric diagnoses of schizophrenia the amygdala in the development of theory of mind and the degree of dissociation between theory of mind and and Asperger's syndrome. We conducted a series of experimental investigations to determine B.M.'s cognitive executive functioning. We conclude that theory of mind is not simply a function of more general executive functioning. In line with his diagnoses, B.M. was found to be severely impaired in his ability to represent mental functions, and that executive functions can develop and function on-line, independently of theory of mind. states. Following this, we conducted a second series of studies to determine B.M.'s executive functioning. In the Moreover, we conclude that the amygdala may play some role in the development of the circuitry mediating theory literature, there have been frequent claims that theory of mind is mediated by general executive functioning. B.M. of mind. showed no indication of executive function impairment,
Introduction
'Theory of mind' refers to the ability to attribute mental syndrome and paranoid delusional schizophrenia (e.g. Frith, 1989; Happé, 1994; Frith and Corcoran, 1996 ; Corcoran states to self and others, and to predict and understand other people's behaviour on the basis of their mental states et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) . (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) . Operationally, individuals are credited with a theory of mind if they succeed in tasks designed to test their understanding that an individual may
The anatomical basis of theory of mind
Several attempts have been made to delineate the brain hold a false belief. For example, in the classic false belief test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) , the subject is introduced to regions involved in theory of mind. For example, BaronCohen has suggested a neural circuit including the amygdala, two dolls, Sally and Ann. Ann moves Sally's marble from the basket, where Sally placed it, to another hiding place superior temporal sulcus and orbitofrontal cortex (BaronCohen, 1995) . In line with this, Baron-Cohen and colleagues while Sally is out of the room. The child is asked where Sally will look for her marble when she returns. Normally used functional MRI (fMRI) to measure brain activity during a task requiring the subject to infer the mental state of an developing children aged~4 years correctly attribute a false belief to Sally, and predict that she will search in the original individual from the expression of their eyes. Areas significantly activated by the task included the left amygdala. location, i.e. where Sally thinks her marble is (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) . Severe impairments in theory of mind have Interestingly, amygdala activation during this task was not seen in individuals with Asperger's syndrome, who were been reported in individuals with autism, Asperger's impaired on this task relative to controls (Baron-Cohen et al., domain-general cognitive functions, namely executive functions (e.g. Frye et al., 1995 Frye et al., , 1996 . Executive functions 1999). In an earlier study, Baron-Cohen and colleagues found activation in the orbitofrontal cortex in a SPECT (single refer to the processes that underlie flexible goal-directed behaviour, e.g. inhibiting dominant responses, creating and photon emission computed tomography) study during a task in which subjects had to decide which aurally presented maintaining goal-related behaviours and temporally sequencing behaviour (Burgess et al., 1998) . Impairment of words 'described the mind or things the mind can do' (Baron- Cohen et al., 1994) .
executive functions is associated with damage to prefrontal areas (e.g. Luria, 1966; Fuster, 1980; Duncan, 1986 ; Shallice, An alternative view of the neural circuitry for theory of mind has been put forward by Frith and Frith. They have 1988) . Evidence from neuropsychological, functional imaging and animal lesion studies suggests that different aspects of argued that this circuitry comprises the superior temporal sulcus, the inferior frontal regions and the medial prefrontal executive functions are dissociable and are mediated by distinct neural systems subserved by different regions of the cortex (Frith and Frith, 1999) . In line with this, a number of neuroimaging studies of mental state processing have prefrontal cortex (e.g. Luria, 1966; Fuster, 1980; Robbins, 1996; Shallice and Burgess, 1996; Damasio, 1998) . observed activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and the region of the temporoparietal junction (Fletcher et al., 1995;  There are three positions regarding the relationship between theory of mind and executive functions. First, it has been Goel et al., 1995; Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000) .
Potentially, the study of individuals with autism and argued that the development of executive functions allows the child's theory of mind to develop, or show its full Asperger's syndrome can aid in the identification of the neural substrate for theory of mind. Individuals with autism potential, on theory of mind tasks (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 1995; 1996 Ozonoff, 1997) . Secondly, it has and Asperger's syndrome consistently fail theory of mind tasks (for reviews, see Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happé and Frith, been argued that there are no specific systems for processing mental states and that performance on theory of mind tasks 1996). This suggests that any brain abnormality consistently observed in autistic individuals might be implicated in theory can be reduced to executive function ability. For example, Frye and colleagues have suggested that theory of mind is of mind. One of a number of brain regions in which there are consistent reports of abnormality in individuals with merely one facet of the ability to act according to embedded rules (Frye et al., 1995 (Frye et al., , 1996 . Embedded rules are of the autism is the amygdala (Baron- Cohen et al., 2000) . Thus, autopsies of autistic individuals point to an abnormal increase form 'if X, if Y, then Z'. They argue that many executive function tasks can be understood in terms of such rules. A in the packing density of grey matter in the amygdala (for a brief review, see Courchesne, 1997) . In addition, a structural third position is that the capacity to represent mental states is necessary for the development of executive functioning MRI study revealed increased volume in the left amygdala and surrounding temporal areas in a group of patients with (e.g. Carruthers, 1996; Perner, 1998; Perner and Lang, 2000) . Thus, Perner argues that planning skills require one to Asperger's syndrome (Abell et al., 1999) . Moreover, in a recent proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy study, Otsuka represent one's own intentions, and that other executive functions, such as inhibitory control and set-shifting, require and colleagues found reduced N-acetyl aspartate concentrations in the amygdala and hippocampal regions of a representation of one's knowledge that the habitual act is maladaptive (Perner, 1998) . a group of autistic children (Otsuka et al., 1999) . They suggest that this may reflect the presence of neuronal dysfunction or Two lines of evidence have been used to suggest that executive functions mediate theory of mind performance. immature neurones.
Thus the amygdala, in particular the left amygdala, may First, recent studies have found that theory of mind and executive function abilities are correlated in pre-school be part of the neural circuitry involved in the processing of mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) . Alternatively, the children (Frye et al., 1995; Hughes, 1998a) . Moreover, executive function performance predicts theory of mind amgydala and/or its connections to regions such as the superior temporal sulcus and medial prefrontal cortex (Amaral performance, but not vice versa (Hughes, 1998b) . Recent research has begun to relate success and failure on particular et al., 1992) may be critical for the development of theory of mind. If this is the case, then early damage to the executive function tasks to performance on theory of mind tests in normal children. In normally developing pre-school amygdala and/or its connections should result in deficits in the processing of mental states. children, correlations have been found between tests of inhibitory control and attentional flexibility, and a test of deceit (Hughes, 1998a) . Secondly, individuals with autism have been found to perform poorly on tests of executive
Theory of mind and executive functioning
The finding that theory of mind is relatively selectively functioning as well as tests of theory of mind (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Hughes et al., 1994) . Ozonoff and colleagues found a impaired in autistic individuals has led some to suggest that theory of mind ability is domain-specific, with a dedicated correlation between performance on executive function and theory of mind tasks in individuals with autism, but not in neural system (e.g. Frith et al., 1991; Leslie and Roth, 1993; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith and Frith, 1999) . In contrast, others control subjects (Ozonoff et al., 1991) . Thus, it has been suggested that the difficulty that autistic individuals have on have argued that mental state information is processed by theory of mind tests is at least in part attributable to their not write to anyone inside or outside of the hospital. B.M. has no visitors, and has indicated that he does not wish to lack of executive control (e.g. Russell, 1995 Russell, , 1996 Russell, , 1997 . Consistent with this, children with autism appear to have have any. He spends most of the time in his room. He never attends hospital social functions, and rarely attends sports particular difficulty with inhibitory control and attentional flexibility (e.g. Hughes and Russell, 1993; events. B.M. is always polite but finds it difficult to approach people. He does not have any hobbies or interests. B.M.'s 1994; Ozonoff, 1997) . These are the two components of executive functioning that have been shown to predict theory mother reports that as a child he was slow in walking and talking, and was rather clumsy. His language developed of mind performance in normal children (Hughes, 1998a) .
While the above data are interesting, such studies are not normally, but his use of it was 'slow and ponderous'. She recalls that he preferred to be on his own, was isolated from suitable for distinguishing between the different accounts of the developmental interaction between theory of mind and his siblings and other children, and showed little imaginative play. He was also often aggressive without provocation. executive functioning for two main reasons. First, in the way that most executive function tasks assess the functioning of A psychiatric opinion based on file information suggested that B.M. suffered from Asperger's syndrome, a schizotypal more than one executive function, theory of mind tasks may not be 'pure' tests of theory of mind but may also involve personality disorder or a schizoaffective disorder. More recently, the diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome has been an executive function component (e.g. Leslie and Thaiss, 1992) . Thus, it is to be expected that there will be correlations, confirmed by an independent assessment carried out by an experienced psychiatrist. It should be noted that DSM-IV or at least a lack of dissociation, between tests of executive function and theory of mind performance in populations who (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition) stipulates that, if an individual has received a do not perform at ceiling on executive function tests, such as individuals with autism and pre-school children. However, diagnosis of schizophrenia, that individual cannot subsequently receive a diagnosis of Asperger's syndrome it should be noted that Perner and Lang, in their review of the literature, consider that the association between theory f (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). This rule has been relaxed by the clinicians involved because, from the clinical mind and executive function performance is found even when theory of mind explanation tasks that putatively have a low records, the patient's Asperger's syndrome preceded his schizophrenia. Moreover, on formal assessment of psychiatric executive function component are used (Perner and Lang, 2000) . Secondly, it may be that the regions of the brain symptomatology he showed little evidence of active schizophrenic illness. On the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale that mediate theory of mind and executive functions are anatomically proximal. If this were the case, even if they are he scored moderate levels for emotional withdrawal and blunted affect. All other scores were mild or not present. For cognitively separable processes, we would still expect to see the observed association of impairment in individuals with the Schedule for Assessment of Negative Symptoms, the global rating of affective flattening was mild and physical autism, at least at the group level. Given the importance of prefrontal circuits in executive functions (e.g. Shallice and anergia was moderate, but all others were rated 1 or 2 (questionable or mild). On the Comprehensive Psychiatric Burgess, 1996) and the proposed role of medial frontal areas in theory of mind processing (e.g. Fletcher et al., 1995) , this Rating Scale, nothing of significance was noted except for a 'severe or incapacitating illness' in the global rating of account of the data is not implausible.
In this paper, we report a forensic patient, B.M., who had illness. Additionally, B.M. completed the Personality Disorders Questionnaire (Hyler et al., 1990) . The completion a congenital or early lesion of the left amygdala. The first aim was to investigate to what extent B.M. showed of the questionnaire is rated 'too good', which suggests that B.M. may be under-reporting his psychopathology. All other impairment in theory of mind. The second aim was to determine the degree to which any theory of mind impairment ratings were below threshold for DSM-IV personality disorders. was independent of executive functioning.
B.M. gave informed consent to participation in all testing sessions. His co-operation throughout the testing sessions was good. This study was approved by the Broadmoor
Case report
B.M. is a 32-year-old, right-handed man who worked as a Hospital ethical committee. caterer. He was arrested in 1994 and subsequently convicted for murder and rape. B.M. was seen in prison for psychiatric assessment before the trial and was diagnosed as suffering Figure 1 shows an MRI scan of B.M.'s brain taken in 1996. from schizophrenia on the basis of formal thought disorder and persecutory and grandiose delusions. Since his admission
Lesion localization
The scan was performed on a transportable 1 GE Signa MRI scanner (1 T), operated by Alliance Medical Ltd (Upton, to the hospital, B.M. has received anti-psychotic medication which, at the time of testing, was flupenthixol depot 400 mg Banbury, UK). The scan reveals an abnormal signal return on T 2 and a possible low-intensity lesion in T 1 in the lateral fortnightly and 10 mg procyclidine twice daily.
Hospital file information revealed that B.M. shows part of the basal nuclei of the left amygdala. There was no generalized atrophy, and the frontal areas gave normal signal profound social isolation, never makes phone calls, and does Comment Overall, B.M.'s neuropsychological assessment shows that his IQ and reading ability are all in the average range. In addition, B.M. has no clinically significant intellectual, memory, language or speed of processing difficulties.
Experimental investigation
The following experimental investigation was carried out over a 20-month period. Substantial assessments of B.M.'s mental state processing and executive functioning were conducted. The first aim of this investigation was to determine whether, given the suggestions of a role for the amygdala in theory of mind (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 , 2000 , B.M. had an impairment in mentalizing.
Control subjects
B.M.'s performance was compared with those of 13 healthy males, matched for educational level, with mean age 30 years (SD ϭ 4) and mean WAIS-R subtests scores of 10.7 (SD ϭ tasks and seven executive functions tasks, and eight subjects performed at least three theory of mind tasks and two executive functions tasks. On seven of the 16 executive return. The scan is consistent with a dysembryonablastic functions tasks, standardized data were used as the neuroepithelial tumour of long standing or of congenital comparison. All control subjects gave informed consent. origin.
Theory of mind assessment Neuropsychological assessment
Ten theory of mind tasks were administered to B.M. There B.M. was assessed on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scalewere five tests assessing understanding of false belief, two revised (WAIS-R) and obtained a Full Scale IQ in the tests assessing understanding of the mental states implied in cartoons, and three tests assessing understanding of intended average range (Table 1 ). In particular, his performance on meaning in non-literal utterances. The control subjects were the Comprehension subtest was superior. Reading also given these tasks, with the exception of the false belief performance on the National Adult Reading (Warrington, 1984) was at the lower end
In false belief tests, the participant must predict a story of the normal range. However, his recognition memory for character's action on the basis of the character's mistaken buildings (Whiteley and Warrington, 1978) was superior, belief about the situation. These tests can either be first-order as was his topographical recognition memory (Warrington, ('Anne thinks that . . .') or second-order ('Mary thinks that 1996). On the Rey Complex Figure Test , he was unimpaired John thinks that . . .'). Two first-order tests and three secondin Copying, but in the low average range for Recall. His order tests were given to B.M. Both the first-order tests performance on all tests in the Adult Memory and Information ['Smarties' (Perner et al., 1989) and 'Sally-Anne' (BaronProcessing Battery was in the 50th percentile or above. His Cohen et al., 1985) ] and the second-order tests ('Chocolates' naming skills were intact. His performance was within the (Roth and Leslie, 1991) , 'Ice Cream Van' (Perner and normal range on the Graded Difficulty Naming Test Wimmer, 1985) and 'Coat Shopping'; Bowler, 1992) ] include (McKenna and Warrington, 1980) . B.M.'s single-word control questions that assess story comprehension and comprehension was within the average range on a stringent memory for what happened in the story. B.M.'s performance on these tasks was exceedingly poor (2 out of 5). He passed synonym test (Warrington et al., 1998) . performed normally on the metaphor task because, unlike sarcasm comprehension, the understanding of metaphor does *These tasks are passed by normally developing children aged 4-8 years.
not require the listener to take into account the thoughts of the speaker in order to reject the nonsensical literal meaning. The metaphor itself can suggest what the intended meaning is, e.g. 'You're a little computer' implies skill at maths. Three scores are generated from the subject's performance Individuals with autism have been found to show impairments on the mental state stories. The first, termed 'total score', in metaphor comprehension (Happé, 1993) . However, this indicates the subject's ability to comprehend the situation. may reflect their difficulty in rejecting literal meanings rather The other two scores refer to the justifications the subject than their difficulty in the representation of mental states. uses when interpreting the behaviour of the story characters, in particular whether the subject refers to the character's Comment mental states of physical information. An example
The above results clearly indicate that B.M. has a significant justification involving mental states for the example story is theory of mind impairment (Table 2) . However, his 'Because Jim knows that Simon always lies and so he performance on all of the control tasks was normal. Thus, should look in the other locations'. An example justification his theory of mind impairment cannot easily be accounted involving physical information for the same story is 'Because for in terms of difficulty in comprehension, abstraction or it will be in the opposite place to wherever Simon says'. memory, as the control tasks also required these abilities. B.M.'s performance was below the range of the comparison Moreover, since many of the theory of mind tests involved group for both total score (17 out of 24) and number of the use of stories, it is worth noting B.M.'s good performance mental state justifications (13 out of 17). For the physical state on the WAIS-R Comprehension subtest and the National control stories, only a total score, indicating comprehension of Adult Reading Test. the situation, is given to subjects' responses. B.M. was in In the literature, there have been frequent claims that the normal range for the control physical state stories (6 out theory of mind is mediated by general executive functioning of 8).
(e.g. Frye et al., 1996; Russell, 1997) . We therefore wished The experiment was replicated and extended with a to determine whether B.M.'s impairment in mentalizing could different set of mental state stories that were structurally be accounted for in terms of a deficit in executive functioning. identical to Set 1 but with superficial details changed (Advanced Theory of Mind Test Set 2). Again, B.M. was below the normal range of the comparison group for both
Executive functions assessment
total score (20 out of 24) and the number of mental state These tests were grouped into three categories: Inhibition (the ability to suppress a habitual response); Intentionality justifications (16 out of 20). (the creation and maintenance of goal-related behaviours); Estimates (Shallice and Evans, 1978) ; and Temporal Judgements (Wilson et al., 1996) . B.M. performed in the and Executive Memory (temporal sequencing). This grouping was based on the results of a factor analysis in which these normal range or above on all six tests of inhibition (Table 3) . categories emerged as the three cognitive components of executive function (Burgess et al., 1998) . Where possible, tests were grouped according to how strongly they loaded
Tasks 17-21: intentionality tests
It has been argued that intentionality, the ability to create onto the three factors in the factor analysis. Tests that were not used in the factor analysis study were grouped according and monitor goal-related behaviour, is a necessary precursor of self-awareness and the development of concepts of mental to their similarity to the tests that were used. It should be noted that many of the tasks have been conceptualized in a states (Russell, 1996) . An impairment in this executive capacity might therefore be predicted in B.M. Intentionality variety of ways (e.g. trail-making has been conceptualized as reflecting set-shifting in addition to inhibition). Indeed, tests require the subject to create and maintain a plan in order to achieve a goal in the absence of any external stimuli many of the tests are likely to index multiple executive functions. However, in the absence of detailed information cueing the appropriate responses. Such tasks also involve the use of embedded rules, which Frye and colleagues have regarding the functions that each of the tasks index, we chose an approach that has been validated empirically (Burgess argued encompasses theory of mind (Frye et al., 1995) . B.M. was given five standardized tests assessing this ability: et al., 1998).
Modified Six Elements Task; Zoo Map; Key Search; Action Program (Wilson et al., 1996) ; and Tower of London (Shallice, 1982) . B.M. performed in the normal range or above on all
Tasks 11-16: inhibition tests B.M. was given six standardized executive function tests of five tests of intentionality (Table 3) . inhibition. Although the superficial features of the tasks are very different, each is thought to require the participant to inhibit a prepotent response. The tests were: Trail-making
Tasks 22-26: executive memory
Tests of executive memory require the participant to shift Part B (Army Individual Test Battery, 1944); Stroop (Stroop, 1935) ; Hayling Sentence Completion (Burgess and Shallice, attention away from a given cue, to transfer attention to another cue, or to do both. As noted in the Introduction, 1996a); Verbal Fluency (e.g. Miller, 1984) ; Cognitive individuals with autism have been shown to be impaired on 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 , 2000 . However, as far as such tasks (Hughes and Russell, 1993; Hughes et al., 1994) .
we are aware, there have been no investigations of theory of B.M. was given five tests that reflect executive memory mind performance in individuals with amygdala lesions. B.M. processes. In all tests but the last, the participant must shift presented with a lesion in the basal nuclei of the left amygdala set from a dominant response according to an arbitrary rule.
that was consistent with a dysembryonablastic neuroepithelial The tests were: Rule Shift (Wilson et al., 1996) ; Modified tumour of long standing or congenital origin. In line with Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Nelson,1976) ; Intrasuggestions that the amygdala may be one of the brain dimensional/Extra-dimensional Shift (Hughes et al., 1994) ; regions involved in the mediation or development of theory Brixton Spatial Anticipation (Burgess and Shallice, 1996b) ; of mind, B.M. presented with profound impairment in and Non-spatial Conditional Learning (Petrides, 1990) . B.M.
mentalizing ability. performed in the normal range or above on all five tests of Several hypotheses can be developed concerning the role executive memory (Table 3) .
of the amygdala in theory of mind functioning. These could be tested in future neuropsychological case studies. First, as suggested by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen,
Comment
1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 , 2000 , the amygdala may B.M. clearly showed normal performance on all aspects of mediate theory of mind functioning. In line with this position, executive functioning. The 16 tests he was given included Baron-Cohen and colleagues, using fMRI, reported left those that have been frequently associated with poor amygdala activation during a task requiring the subject to performance on theory of mind tasks, i.e. those involving infer the mental state of an individual from the expression inhibition, the use of embedded rules and the execution of of their eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999 also present with structural abnormalities involving the However, this subject showed no impairment on any of the amygdala (for a review, see Lawrie and Abukmeil, 1998) . theory of mind tasks.
This position predicts that other patients with amygdala lesions, whether these occur early in development or in
Discussion
adulthood, should present with theory of mind impairment. B.M., who had a unilateral left amygdala lesion of Secondly, appropriate amygdala functioning may be a longstanding or congenital origin, showed profound difficulty prerequisite for the development of theory of mind even if in representing the mental states of others. B.M. performed it is not itself involved in mediating the representation consistently poorly on 10 mental state processing tasks, of mental states. The amygdala certainly has extensive assessing false belief understanding (tasks 1-5), mental state interconnections with regions of the medial prefrontal cortex understanding in the comprehension of cartoons (tasks 6 and and the superior temporal sulcus (e.g. Amaral et al., 1992) . 7) and the understanding of intended meaning in non-literal Both these areas have been implicated in the circuitry that utterances (tasks 8-10). We investigated the degree to which mediates theory of mind (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al. , his theory of mind impairment was independent of executive 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000) . This position predicts that functioning. B.M. was given 16 executive function tests patients whose amygdala lesions were acquired very early in assessing his ability to inhibit dominant responses, to create life should show impairment in theory of mind but patients and maintain goal-related behaviours, and to sequence whose lesions were acquired in adulthood should not. Thirdly, behaviour temporally (tasks 11-26). The battery included it is possible that B.M.'s amygdala lesion plays no role executive function tests that previous research has associated in his theory of mind impairment. For example, B.M.'s with the development of theory of mind. B.M. performed in impairment could be due to undetected damage elsewhere in the normal range or above on all the executive function tests. the system. Fourthly, B.M.'s early social isolation may have These findings show that the neurocognitive system mediating caused his theory of mind impairment (anonymous reviewer's theory of mind is developmentally separable from the suggestion). neurocognitive systems mediating executive functions, and that executive functions can develop and function on-line, independently of theory of mind.
Implications for the relationship between theory of mind and executive functioning Implications for the anatomy of theory of mind
There has been considerable debate concerning the association There have been recent claims that the amygdala may be involved in the mediation of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, between theory of mind and executive functioning. Indeed, many have argued that there is no specific neurocognitive have suffered damage to many neurocognitive systems that rely on the prefrontal cortex. Similarly, the findings of system that mediates theory of mind, but rather that performance on theory of mind tasks is mediated, at least in correlations in normally developing children between theory of mind and executive functioning (e.g. Hughes, 1998a , b) part, by executive functioning (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1991; Frye et al., 1995 Frye et al., , 1996 Ozonoff, 1997; Russell, 1995 Russell, , 1996 may either reflect proximal systems or similarity in the developmental time course between theory of mind and 1997). There are two main forms of this argument. First, it has been argued that the development of executive functions specific executive functions. An alternative position on the relationship between theory allows the child's theory of mind to develop or show its full potential (e.g. Ozonoff et al., 1991; Russell, 1995 Russell, , 1996 of mind and executive functioning has been developed by Carruthers (Carruthers, 1996) and, more formally, by Perner 1997; Ozonoff, 1997) . Secondly, it has been argued that there are no specific systems for processing mental states and that and colleagues (Perner, 1998; Perner et al., 1999; Perner and Lang, 2000) . These authors suggest that the capacity to performance on theory of mind tasks can be reduced to executive function ability (e.g. Frye et al., 1996) . represent mental states is necessary in order to develop executive functions. Indeed, Perner has argued that, 'Since B.M. presented with a profound impairment in theory of mind in the complete absence of any impairment in executive executive functions are characterised by formulation of higher-order intentions and representations, they need the functioning. This clearly indicates, contrary to some suggestions, that performance on theory of mind tasks cannot conceptual repertoire for expressing these higher-order states, i.e. a theory of mind. So one would expect people with a be reduced to executive function ability. Indeed, it is important to note that B.M. showed no impairment on the executive deficient theory of mind to have executive function problems.' (Perner, 1998: 277-8) . function tasks that are typically found to be impaired in individuals with autism, e.g. the Wisconsin Card Sorting
More specifically, Perner argues that meta-representational abilities are essential in order to overcome dominant responses Task and the Tower of London (Pennington and Ozonoff, 1996) . Moreover, it is important to note that B.M. showed or old strategies, as in tests of inhibition and attentional setshifting (Perner, 1998; Perner and Lang, 2000) B.M. passed no impairment on the executive function tasks that neuroimaging and lesion work has indicated recruit areas of only two out of five simple false belief tests. From this, Perner's position would predict impairment in the inhibitory the medial frontal cortex. These tasks include the Stroop task and Conditional Learning (e.g. Petrides, 1990; Bench et al., and attentional set-shifting components of executive functions. However B.M.'s performance on all executive 1993; Carter et al., 1997) . Very proximal areas of the medial frontal cortex have been shown to be recruited during theory functions was normal. This suggests that executive functions do not require the same representational abilities as those of mind processing (Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000) . Thus, it is clear that an impairment involved in mental state processing. The performance of B.M. thus clearly supports the position other than in executive functioning caused B.M.'s impairment on the theory of mind tasks. Given the considerable variety that theory of mind ability is domain-specific, with a dedicated neural system (e.g. Frith et al., 1991; Leslie and Roth, 1993 ; of tasks used, addressing different modalities and with a range of task demands, the most parsimonious explanation Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith and Frith, 1999) . B.M. presented with a very severe impairment in theory of mind but no is that his impairment was due to an impairment in the ability to represent mental states. impairment in executive functioning. While B.M.'s difficulty on theory of mind tasks was clearly due to a specific problem with the representation of mental states, this may not be typically the case in autism, in which
Conclusions
This study has demonstrated a dissociation between theory executive dysfunction has been reported widely (Ozonoff et al., 1991) . Indeed, it could still be argued that executive of mind and executive functions in an individual with a congenital or very early lesion of the left amygdala. This functions are necessary (if not sufficient) for successful performance on theory of mind tasks (Russell, 1995; Ozonoff, finding suggests a possible role for the left amygdala and/or its connections in the development of understanding of mental 1997). This position has to predict that individuals with executive function impairment should fail on theory of mind states. In addition, the findings clearly suggest that theory of mind is neither mediated by nor necessary for executive tasks. However, with regard to the executive functions of inhibitory control and attentional set-shifting, this prediction functioning. Rather, the present findings suggest that theory of mind is mediated by a domain-specific, dedicated neural does not appear to hold. Recently, a patient, J.S., was reported with 'acquired sociopathy' following frontal lobe damage. system. J.S. failed two of four tests of inhibitory control and one of two tests of attentional set-shifting. However, he performed normally on the Advanced Theory of Mind Test (Blair 
